With 12,500 members from nearly 90 countries, INFORMS is the largest international association of operations research (O.R.) and analytics professionals and students. INFORMS provides unique networking and learning opportunities for individual professionals, and organizations of all types and sizes, to better understand and use O.R. and analytics tools and methods to transform strategic visions and achieve better outcomes. Abstract. We study a microprocessor company selling short-life-cycle products to a set of buyers that includes large consumer electronic goods manufacturers. The seller has a limited capacity for each product and negotiates with each buyer for the price. Our analysis of their sales data reveals that larger purchases do not always result in bigger discounts. Instead, the discount curve is like an "N." While existing theories cannot explain this nonmonotonic pattern, we develop an analytical model and show that the nonmonotonicity is rooted in how sellers value capacity when negotiating with a buyer. Large buyers accelerate the selling process and small buyers are helpful in consuming the residual capacity. However, satisfying midsized buyers may be costly because supplying these buyers can make it difficult to utilize the remaining capacity, which is often too much for small buyers but not enough for large buyers. We briefly discuss the implications for capacity rationing and posted pricing as well as potential applications to other industries.
Introduction
While conventional wisdom suggests that larger purchase quantities are generally associated with lower prices (e.g., Spence 1977 , Oren et al. 1982 , Jeuland and Shugan 1983 , Weng 1995 , our empirical observations raise doubts. We interacted with managers of a large semiconductor company and obtained a sales data set that spans a three-year period. In this data, we found several instances wherein larger-quantity buyers paid higher prices. Five such examples are illustrated in Table 1 and buyers are sorted into three groups-small, medium, and large-according to their total purchase quantities. Interestingly, the average price received by the medium-quantity group is less than the prices obtained by the other two groups; moreover, the largequantity group received the highest average price in four of the five examples. The data set has many such instances in which larger buyers paid higher prices. In particular, if we rank buyers of a product according to their total purchase quantities, in approximately 26% of the cases, a buyer paid a higher average price than a neighboring, smaller-quantity buyer. These observations point to nonmonotonic price patterns.
Our task was threefold in this research. First, we empirically tested whether a nonmonotonic pricequantity relation generally exists. Second, we explored theoretical explanations for this phenomenon, and finally, we determined the managerial implications that flow from such a pricing pattern. In the first step, we used a set of linear and nonlinear regressions to control for other possible influences on product price and found that the discount rate received by a buyer is statistically a nonmonotonic function of the buyer's demand share (or relative size) for the product. Specifically, the discount increases with demand share for small quantities; however, as demand share increases, the discount decreases and then increases again. In brief, we observed an N-shaped discount curve, which cannot be explained by the existing literature.
In the second step, we developed an analytical model based on the practices of the focal company for which the product life cycle is short, capacity is inflexible, and prices are set through one-shot negotiations. We showed that our model fits the data and can yield the price-quantity curves found in the data. Our model suggests that the nonmonotonic price-quantity relation is rooted in how the seller values her capacity when negotiating with a buyer. Large buyers accelerate the selling process and small buyers are helpful in consuming the residual capacity. However, satisfying midsized buyers may be costly because supplying these buyers can make it difficult to utilize the remaining capacity, which may be too much for small buyers but not enough for large buyers. Therefore, midsized buyers are charged a "premium." Several managerial insights flow from our analytical model. Basically, given that each transaction has an impact on subsequent transactions, a good model of the price-quantity relation is necessary for the optimization of the trade-off between the profit from the current buyer and that of future buyers. Our analysis shows that it is important for the seller to control the capacity allocated to each buyer before price negotiations, if possible. Our model can also help the seller to optimize the posted price, which balances the profit between buyers who take the price and buyers who choose to bargain.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present a brief literature review in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce the industry and firm practices. In Section 4, we show our empirical observation through linear and nonlinear regressions. We then build a model in Section 5 and analyze the problem in Section 6. We discuss the managerial implications of our findings in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8. All of the proofs are in the electronic companion.
Related Literature
Our work is related to four areas of research, the first of which concerns quantity-discount policies. In the operations management and marketing literature, quantity-discount models have been widely studied (e.g., Spence 1977 , Oren et al. 1982 , Jeuland and Shugan 1983 , and Weng 1995 . In this research stream, it is assumed that one party will offer a contract in a takeit-or-leave-it fashion and buyers with greater demand receive lower prices. Assuming that one party has full bargaining power simplifies the analysis, but it also ignores prevailing practices in which buyers negotiate.
The second related area is business-to-business (B2B) price bargaining. Kohli and Park (1989) analyzed a two-party bargaining problem that is based on an economic order quantity (EOQ) model and showed that the optimal discount increases with purchase quantity. Snyder (1998) and Chipty and Snyder (1999) discussed the impact of buyer-demand size on price discount. Snyder (1998) showed that, when many suppliers compete to sell to one buyer, the price offered to the seller in equilibrium initially increases with buyer size and then decreases with buyer size. However, the result requires that suppliers cooperate and buyers appear sequentially over an infinite horizon, which are both very strong assumptions in supply chains. Chipty and Snyder (1999) showed that a merger enhances (worsens) a buyer's bargaining position if the supplier's payoff function is concave (convex) in total transaction size. Our data exhibit a more complicated price pattern than what is predicted by these models.
Other studies on B2B bargaining have assumed a given size of the pie and explored how the pie is allocated among channel members. While Dukes et al. (2006) and Lovejoy (2010) focused on the impact of channel structure, Nagarajan and Bassok (2008) considered suppliers in an assembly chain who form multilateral bargaining coalitions and compete for a position in the bargaining sequence. We supplement this branch of literature by considering a seller who sequentially negotiates with a group of buyers and we investigate the impact of a buyer's purchase quantity on the discount.
Our research is also related to revenue management. Kuo et al. (2011) first studied revenue management for limited inventories when buyers negotiate and considered a dynamic setting with fixed compositions of price-takers and bargainers with the assumption that each buyer only buys one unit of the product and the posted price is updated frequently. The authors characterized the optimal posted price and the resulting negotiation outcome as a function of inventory and time and showed that negotiation is an effective tool to achieve price discrimination. In contrast, our paper considers a dynamic, capacity-rationing problem in a B2B market in which buyers request different quantities and quantities influence prices.
Our work is closely related to research on dynamic and stochastic knapsack problems that study optimal admission or pricing policies when capacity is limited. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) categorize this type of problem as revenue management with group arrivals. While early studies such as Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) and Kleywegt and Papastavrou (1998) showed Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 2108 -2126 , © 2016 that the optimal expected revenue is concave in capacity if each buyer requires the same amount, Kleywegt and Papastavrou (2001) showed that concavity does not hold in general when demands are heterogeneous. Kleywegt and Papastavrou (2001) focused on characterizing the conditions under which concavity holds, and we focus on characterizing the property of the value function under which the price-quantity relation is nonmonotonic.
Last, our research is related to capacity management in the semiconductor industry. Wu et al. (2005) provided a good review of this literature. Karabuk and Wu (2003) studied strategic capacity planning in the presence of demand and capacity uncertainties. Cohen et al. (2003) proposed a model to estimate the imputed costs of an equipment supplier. Terwiesch et al. (2005) empirically studied the demand forecast sharing process between a buyer and a set of equipment suppliers. Karabuk and Wu (2005) studied incentive issues when product managers compete for capacity. Peng et al. (2012) worked with Intel and developed an equipment procurement framework that allowed Intel to make a combination of base and flexible capacity reservations with suppliers. Different from all of these studies, the current paper helps semiconductor companies to understand the value of their capacities when customers arrive sequentially and differ in order quantities.
To summarize, our paper makes the following contributions. First, we provide an empirical analysis that reveals the existence of a nonmonotonic price-quantity relation in the semiconductor industry. Second, we develop a model to investigate this phenomenon and find a plausible explanation. Third, we show a simple and sufficient condition for the price-quantity relation to be nonmonotonic.
Industry and Firm Practices

Market Structure
The microprocessor market is intensely competitive, with rapid technological advancements, short product life cycles, and frequent pricing activities. Many competing sellers such as Intel, Nvidia, and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) sell multiple product lines primarily to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), such as Hewlett-Packard (HP), Lenovo, and Dell.
Capacity Inflexibility
For sellers to remain competitive, they need production capacity with up-to-date process technology, which requires heavy capital investments. Some sellers such as Intel manufacture products in-house, while others such as AMD only focus on product design and outsource production to third-party foundries. In both cases, because manufacturing facilities are costly and construction lead times are long, capacities are inflexible during a selling season. Although capacity configuration at a manufacturing facility can be altered, doing so disrupts flows in the manufacturing facility and causes increased manufacturing cycle times (Karabuk and Wu 2003) . A common practice in this industry is for sellers to allocate capacity to product lines based on demand forecasts and start production several months before demand is realized. The forecasts represent sales commitments from product line managers and sometimes (nonbinding) purchase commitments from customers. Once the capacity is allocated to a product, production starts almost immediately. In this way, sellers can first increase capacity utilization. Second, due to the long production lead time, which is on average 6-12 weeks, sellers can build up inventory in advance in order to satisfy customers that normally require immediate delivery. Last but not least, semiconductor manufacturing entails significant learning and it takes time for yield to ramp up and for quality to improve. Thus, when facing a supply shortage, it is not only costly but also risky for sellers to seek an alternative source. Given these facts, it is important for sellers' product managers to provide accurate forecasts and sell according to allocated capacities.
Price Negotiation
Although each product has a posted price, the final price for each buyer is usually set through negotiations. Major buyers are sophisticated, drive hard bargains, and often enjoy higher annual revenues than sellers (Cooper 2008) . Buyers know that the marginal production cost of microprocessors is low and that sellers are eager to discount prices to fully utilize their capacities. Moreover, buyers can allocate their business among competing sellers. Lacking full pricing power, sellers are unable to use pricing strategies, such as take-it-orleave-it price schedules or a menu of contracts, and have to engage in negotiations. Once a price is settled, the contract duration can vary for different buyers and products; price renegotiations happen frequently but not in all cases.
1 In our data set, approximately 45% of the purchases did not involve any renegotiation.
Procurement Quantity
The purchase quantity is not normally a term for negotiation. In principle, although buyers can allocate their requirements among alternative semiconductor firms, they do so at a very early stage in the planning process because products offered by different sellers differ in technical features and influence the design of the buyer's products. 2 In addition, sellers' brand images may matter in buyers' markets. To produce the end products, buyers need many different inputs, and the compositions of the inputs are interdependent. As a result, buyers' procurement managers prefer to stick to their internal production plans and procure the desired quantity at the best possible price. In summary, buyers determine their purchase quantities based on production plans before negotiating with suppliers and incur costs if they are unable to procure these amounts and must switch to an alternative seller. Contracts, however, do not stipulate any purchase commitments from the buyers.
Technology Upgrades
In this industry, the risk of obsolescence is a constant. Sellers are aware that technological advancements can cause a rapid decline in demand for existing products. Although they are aware of development cycles in the industry and can anticipate when rivals will introduce products, sellers must consider the likelihood of a demand shock and the possibility of having to salvage inventories (Karabuk and Wu 2003) .
Empirical Observation and Analysis
The data provided by a major global semiconductor company for use in this study encompass sales of 3,826 products to 251 buyers over a three-year period. Each record in the data set consists of customer ID, product ID, product category, product brand (subcategory), sales territory, bill quantity, bill value in U.S. dollars (USD), unit price, and date of transaction. Products sold include central processing units (CPUs), graphics processing units (GPUs), and embedded chips, among others.
4.1. Data Preparation 4.1.1. Fixed-Price Contracts. As buyers normally purchase a product through multiple transactions over time, the prices may be renegotiated. In this paper, however, we focus on purchases in which prices are fixed over the entire product life cycle. We say that such transactions are made under fixed-price contracts. The analysis for fixed-price contracts or one-shot price bargaining is simpler than for repeated negotiations.
Let I and J be the indices of buyer and product, respectively. Let i j be the set of dates at which buyer i purchased product j. Let q i jt and p i jt denote the transaction quantity and price for customer i and product j at time t ∈ i j . We define an instance θ i j as the set of transactions related to buyer i ∈ I and product j ∈ J; i.e., θ i j : {(t, q i jt , p i jt ): t ∈ i j }. For fixed-price contracts, we have p i jt p i j for all t ∈ i j . As previously stated, in this industry it is a common practice for a buyer to enter a price negotiation with a predetermined target quantity. The life cycle purchase quantity is the target. Hence, we focus on the relationship between the total purchase quantity TQ i j t∈ i j q i jt and the fixed price p i j .
Normalization.
Widely varying prices and market sizes for different products compel us to normalize the data. Prices of the 425 brands (or product subcategories) range from several dollars to more than $100 per unit. In place of the price and total quantity, we use two ratio metrics: (1) effective discount (ED) rate and (2) demand share (DS). Define
(1)
where : i j . Both variables have a range of [0, 1]. ED is an inverse measure of price level relative to the highest price ever paid for the product. It is important to note that, in the case of the seller who provided us this data set, posted prices are very stable. As the vast majority of the posted prices remain unchanged for more than a year, for a fixed-price contract the nominal discount rate is almost constant over time, and the ED is very close or equal to the nominal discount rate. DS is the ratio of the total quantity purchased by a buyer relative to the market size for that product. The advantage of ED and DS is that they simultaneously control for the mean and variation across different products. However, in the vast majority of instances, demand shares are concentrated around 0 (as shown in Figure 1 on the left) due to the 20-80 rule; i.e., 80% of customers contribute only 20% of sales. Therefore, it is difficult to examine how quantity affects price discount if we use DS. To circumvent this limitation, we use a power transformation of demand share (PTDS); i.e., PTDS DS γ for a γ ∈ (0, 1). PTDS has several advantages. First, it is a monotonic transformation of DS so the pricequantity relationship is preserved. Second, its empirical distribution has a larger spread relative to DS (as shown in Figure 1 on the right); third, the range of [0, 1] is preserved. As shown in Table 2 , the distribution has the highest spread when γ is between 0.25 and 0.35, and γ 0.25 yields a distribution that is the closest to normal in this range. 4 We focus on the fourth-root transformation (i.e., γ 0.25). Later, to check robustness, we consider the following values for γ: 0.15, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.35. Our objective is now reduced to identifying the relationship between ED i j and PTDS i j while controlling for other factors.
Data Filtering.
The data set corresponds to a three-year period from January 1, 2009 , to March 25, 2012 . Instances that started before January 1, 2009, and those that lasted beyond March 25, 2012, have missing data (or are truncated). Because prices in the microprocessor market decrease over time, instances with left truncation appear to have smaller total quantities and higher prices than subsequent instances. Similarly, instances with right truncation appear to have smaller total quantities and lower prices than preceding instances. Mixing these two effects may generate Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 2108 -2126 , © 2016 The fourth root of demand share (r4ds) a nonmonotonic relationship between price and quantity. To mitigate the effects of truncation, we only consider instances with an observed starting date that is at least one quarter after January 1, 2009, and an observed ending date that is at least one quarter earlier than March 25, 2012. There are 6,573 instances (approximately 53%) that satisfy these criteria. Furthermore, to focus on regular purchases and not transactions for one-time substitutions or sample testing, which follow a different selling process, we drop another 312 instances (approximately 4.7%) that have only one purchase record. Finally, products that have an extremely small number of buyers are often customized and may follow a different selling process. Such products also tend to have buyers with very high demand-shares and narrow price dispersions and, as a result, our proxies for these products' posted prices could be downward-biased. To avoid this bias, we drop another 1,551 instances (approximately 18%) and consider only products that have more than three buyers. In this way, we obtain a subset of the data with 2,346 fixed-price instances and 2,364 price-renegotiated instances. In the electronic companion, we use the Heckman selection model to correct for the selection bias and show that our data filtering does not change the price-quantity pattern.
Variables
Aside from the demand share, other variables may also influence a customer's discount. According to the generalized Nash bargaining model (Nash 1950, Roth and Malouf 1979) , these variables fall into three broad categories: the seller's outside options, the buyer's outside options, and the respective bargaining powers of both buyer and seller. As far as we can imagine, the seller's outside options are affected by production cost, salvage value, buyer-side competition, time of purchase, capacity or inventory level, and demand uncertainty. The buyer's outside options are affected by the value of adopting a different product, seller-side competition, posted price, and time of purchase. Bargaining powers are affected by the value of the business relationship, the bargaining skills of salespersons and procurement managers, and the buyer's reputation for committing to a forecast. In the following, we explain the variables included in our regression. Table 3 provides the summary statistics, and Table 4 shows the correlation among the variables. Power transformation of demand share. We first focus on the relationship between ED and the fourth root of demand share (r4ds). Later, we will consider other power transformations of demand share (e.g., DS 0.15 , DS 0.2 , DS 0.3 , and DS 0.35 ) to check the robustness. Cbase. This variable counts the total number of buyers for a product and is thus a measure of a product's popularity and the buyer-side competition.
TSQ. The total sales quantity of a product, this variable also captures the popularity of a product.
Herf. This variable Herfindahl index for the demand structure of a product measures the degree of demand concentration. It is the square root of the sum of the square of demand shares across all the buyers of a product (Weinstock 1982) . lndod. Because, in general, effective prices (or priceperformance ratios) in the semiconductor industry decrease over time, the later a buyer arrives the greater the discount (relative to the posted price) he may obtain. To capture this effect, we use the logarithm of days of delay, which is calculated as the difference in the number of days between the starting date of an instance and the first date that the product was ever purchased. In addition, lndod is also a measure of demand uncertainty because uncertainty is resolved over time. Note that the introduction date of a product is unobserved, but the starting date of the first purchase is normally a good proxy.
lndrt. The discount may also be related to the rate of purchase. We control for this effect by the logarithm of the duration of an instance. Duration of an instance is given by the number of days between the first and the last date of that instance. We note parenthetically that the duration of an instance in our data set is fairly short, with an average of 232 days.
M3. It is well known that the end-of-quarter effect has a bearing on bargaining. We introduce M3 as a binary variable for an instance, with a value equal to 1 if the date of the first order is in the third month of a quarter and 0 otherwise.
CapL. Although the remaining capacity at the time of price negotiation is a consideration for both parties, we do not have information about the capacity level. We approximate the total capacity by the total sales of a product divided by the semiconductor industry capacity-utilization rate (approximately 85%). 5 The capacity available for a specific buyer is then the difference between the total capacity level and the cumulative contracted sales before this buyer. We use CapL (available capacity level)/(total sales) as a control variable.
Cshr. A buyer that accounts for a large portion of the seller's business can have significant bargaining power. To capture this aspect of the bargaining power we use the measure Cshr (customer share). Cshr is 100 times the total quantity purchased by a buyer divided by the seller's total sales volume across all products during the time period being studied. It measures the value of a buyer to the seller. 6 Note that using the total purchase value as a control variable may induce endogeneity as the value depends on the price discount.
Vrate. Since we use the highest price paid for a product as an approximation of the posted price, small variations in the price of a product will result in low ED, and thus we have to also control for price variations. However, prices depend on discounts. To avoid this endogeneity, we use the fraction of the instance in which the price was renegotiated to measure a product's price variation. Buyers with renegotiable-price contracts are more likely to get the posted price at the beginning and experience price variations that are larger than those with fixed-price contracts. In addition, Vrate measures the uncertainty of the product's value, because price renegotiations normally happen when uncertainties are resolved. For fixed-price contracts, discounts are likely to be larger when uncertainties are higher.
Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 2108 -2126 , © 2016 Product-line (or brand) fixed effect. To capture productline-specific impacts such as seller-side competition, production costs, and salvage values, we use binary variables for the 16 major brands that have at least 100 observed instances in the original data set. It is also important to note that the seller's salespeople are organized by product lines. Thus, the impact of a salesperson's bargaining ability is product line specific and can be captured by the product-line fixed effect.
Buyer fixed effect. A buyer's bargaining power is also affected by unobservable factors, such as the experience of the procurement manager and the reputation for honoring a commitment. Hence, we use binary variables to control buyer fixed effects for the 10 major buyers ranked on the basis of total purchase value. The remaining buyers serve as a reference.
Quarter fixed effect. To capture the industry dynamics that are cyclical within a financial year, we use the first quarter as the reference and binary variables for the other three quarters.
Location fixed effect. The degree of market competition on both the buyer and seller sides may depend on location. We use binary variables for 9 of the 10 recorded sales territories, such as greater China and North America. Additionally, location may also be an indicator for cost and demand uncertainty.
Interaction effect. The impact of capacity level may depend on elapsed time. The likelihood of a technology shock increases over time, and, once a shock occurs, the seller may have to salvage the remaining capacity. Hence, the value of capacity may diminish as time elapses and we include the interaction between CapL and lndod.
Although we include many variables, we still have the "omitted variable" problem. Consistent estimators can be obtained only when the omitted variables are uncorrelated with our regressors. The factors we do not control for are the net cost of switching to an alternative product and contract terms other than price and quantity for a buyer. In the electronic companion, we show that under certain mild assumptions the estimated coefficients are just the scaled true marginal effects when these two factors are relevant but missing. Hence, the shape of the price-quantity relationship will be preserved. Finally, note that we only consider instances with one-shot bargaining (or a fixed-price contract) for new products, and, as such, it is reasonable not to consider any reference effects from previous discounts.
Regression Analysis
In this section, we explore the empirical relationship between the effective discount and demand share in two steps. In the first step we partition the buyers into groups based on their demand share and compute the average effective discount received by buyers in each segment. Based on the observed pattern, in the second step we use piecewise polynomial regressions to fit a functional form. Our analyses in these two steps are both necessary and complementary. The first step provides us with information about the shape of the function, the possible location(s) of the knot(s), and the order of polynomial functions. The second step allows us to test the statistical significance of the functional form. 4.3.1. Average Discounts by Segments. For robustness, we consider two different segmentation approaches that are detailed are in Table 5 . In model (i), we divide the instances into six segments according to r4ds. We use wider ranges for the first and last segments in order to include more instances in the "tails." In model (ii), we use nine segments. Incorporating all our control variables, we run the linear regression ED k>1 a k · seg k + b X + for each model, where seg k is a binary indicator for segment k, X is the vector of controlled covariates (including the constant), and is the error term. The estimates for a are summarized in Table 5 and for b in Table 7 . 7 We can see that in both models the marginal impact of demand share on discount displays a similar nonmonotonic pattern. In model (i), the estimated coefficient increases with demand share in the first four segments, then decreases in segment 5, and increases again in segment 6. In model (ii), the coefficient increases until segment 6, then decreases in segment 7, and increases again. These results indicate that the discount is likely to be an N-shaped function of demand share. In Figure 2 , we plot the average discount received by each segment and a smooth line connecting them. In both graphs, all the other controlled variables take their mean values.
Although the smooth lines look like an "N" in both graphs of Figure 2 , it is still difficult to determine the statistical significance of this finding. What we can infer is that it may be inappropriate to use a simple monotone function or a polynomial function. The discount curve is more likely to be a combination of a monotonically increasing curve and a V-shaped curve. Accordingly, in the next step, we fit a piecewise polynomial function and test the significance of the nonmonotonicity. 4.3.2. Piecewise Polynomial Regression. To reduce the number of parameters while maintaining adequate flexibility, we use a two-segment, piecewise quadratic function with an unknown knot to fit the data in model (iii).
8 This allows us to infer whether the function is linear or quadratic in each segment and where the two smooth lines are connected. We let B denote the location of the knot and run a least-squares regression with the following nonlinear model: where x − min{x, 0}, x + max{x, 0}, X is the vector of controlled covariates (including the constant), and is the error term. We run this nonlinear least-squares (NLS) regression in Stata with the command nl. The estimates are sensitive to initial values for the iteration performed by nl. To minimize the reliance on initial guesses, we first run the NLS regression to estimate B and then run an OLS regression using the estimated B to obtain other parameters. We report the estimates for a 1 -a 4 and B in Table 6 and b in Table 7 . We can see from Table 6 that a 1 is significant (at the 5% level) but a 2 is not, meaning that a linear relationship is significant in the first (left) segment. In the second (right) segment, a 3 is significant at the 10% level (for the two-sided test) and a 4 is significant at the 5% level, meaning that a quadratic relationship is significant here. Because B 0.5668 is highly significant (at the 0.1% level), the functional form cannot be described by a single linear or quadratic function. If we assume in advance in model (iv) that the relationship is linear in the first (left) segment and quadratic in the second (right) segment, we will get similar results. Note that the minimum of the quadratic curve is achieved at r4ds −a 3 /(2a 4 ) + B ≈ 0.1 + B > B, meaning that discount in the second segment first decreases with demand share and then increases. To establish the significance of nonmonotonicity, we need to test the null hypothesis that a 3 ≥ 0. For this one-sided test, we have p-values less than 5% for both models (iii) and (iv). Hence, we can now claim that the empirical relationship between discount and demand share is indeed N-shaped.
To check the sensitivity of the estimated shape to the location of the knot, we run two linear regressions based on model (iii) but with B 0.5668 ± 2 × 0.0309. We call these two regressions models (v) and (vi), respectively, and we plot the predicted average effective discount against r4ds in Figure 3 . Although setting Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 2108 -2126 , © 2016 a biased knot could smooth out the decreasing part of the curve, we continue to observe N-shaped curves under both models (v) and (vi) . From this analysis we also find that the predicted discount decreases with the number of buyers for a product, increases with a buyer's size, 9 increases with the delays, and increases with the remaining capacity level. Additionally, the interaction effect between elapsed time and capacity level is negative. In other words, the impact of capacity level decreases over time, and the impact of time delay decreases with capacity 
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(1.31e 9) (1.29e 9) (1.27e 9) (1. 30e 9 level. It is interesting to find that the effective discount is not significantly correlated with the end-of-quarter effect and the demand concentration rate, which may occur because fixed-price contracts entail long-term considerations and demand concentration is not a good measure for product popularity.
Robustness Checks
To determine whether discount is influencing demand share simultaneously, we regress r4ds against ED and other control variables using dummies for three quarters as instrumental variables. We find no support for simultaneity. Next, we run four additional nonlinear piecewise polynomial regressions using DS 0.15 , DS 0.2 , DS 0.3 , and DS 0.35 , respectively, in place of r4ds in (3), and we obtain similar nonmonotonic curves. Then, we find that omitting the buyer's net cost of switching and the value of other contract terms does not affect the nonmonotonic pattern if certain mild conditions hold. Last, we find that an "N" shape persists and is significant even after correcting for sample selection biases. The details of the robustness checks are in the electronic companion.
Further Discussions
Our observations from the regressions analysis are particularly interesting because they are inconsistent with conventional wisdom as well as our intuition: we anticipated that buyers with larger quantities would receive lower prices. While our intuition is correct for small-and large-quantity buyers, we observe a discount valley for medium-sized buyers that cannot be fully explained by existing theories. Why do we see such a discount curve? Although existing theories can predict increasing or V-shaped discount curves, they work under very different premises and cannot account for an "N" curve. Hence, we need models that shed light on price negotiations in B2B markets such as the semiconductor industry and identify factors that give rise to the observed patterns.
Our empirical findings also have important implications for both buyers and sellers. Because larger quantities may not always lead to lower prices, a buyer has to consider this possibility while determining the purchase quantity. Despite this nonmonotonic pricing pattern, arbitrage opportunities do not necessarily exist for buyers, because empirically the total purchase cost still increases with quantity. 10 For the seller, this nonmonotonic relationship may require paying careful attention to posted prices and capacity allocated to different buyers. In the following sections we develop an analytical model to explore the rationale behind our observations.
Modeling and Verification
To deepen our understanding, we develop a model for a single product and make the following key assumptions. Table 8 . , 2017 , , vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 2108 , -2126 , , © 2016 
The Model
Consider a seller (she) that sells a new product to a group of OEMs. has κ units of a fixed capacity. To be specific, we denote κ as the maximum amount of the product that can be produced during the product life cycle. The current industry practice is that major microprocessor companies produce according to their forecasts and start production as soon as the forecast is confirmed. Thus, the capacity does not expire during the planned product life cycle. The selling starts at time 0 and ends when no more buyers exist or the capacity is sold out. There are M potential buyers who arrive according to a general, nonhomogeneous Poisson arrival process. The arrival rate of the ith buyer after the arrival of the (i − 1)th buyer is λ i < ∞ for i 1, 2, . . . , M. For simplicity, we assume that the arrival process is only determined by market characteristics and is independent of buyer identities or the history of the arrival process.
As previously stated, in the semiconductor industry, technological advancements of competing products will lead to obsolescence. When such a technological shock happens, buyers that have already adopted the product and integrated it into their product designs will continue their planned purchase. However, new buyers will cease to arrive and any unsold capacity will have to be salvaged. We assume that the arrival time of the technological shock is exponentially distributed with rate λ 0 and that seller salvages the remaining capacity at a marginal value s when the shock arrives. Let δ i ∈ (0, 1) represent the probability of the shock arriving after the (i − 1)th and before the ith buyer. We can check that δ i λ 0 /(λ 0 + λ i ).
Let D i denote the total purchase requirement (or demand) of the ith buyer and Q i the capacity allocated to buyer i. We assume that buyers accept partial fulfillment as long as Q i ∈ [ηD i , D i ], where η ∈ (0, 1] is plausibly an industry standard that is exogenous and identical for all the buyers. Hence, if η < 1, seller faces a dynamic capacity-management problem wherein she must decide the degree of fulfillment ρ i for buyer i in order to maximize the total expected revenue. Let K i be the total available capacity when buyer i arrives, so K i /D i is the maximum level of fulfillment and
Demand is unknown to the seller ex ante but is exogenously given. Each buyer's production plan is determined in advance as it is costly for buyer i to manipulate D i . Although demand may not be exogenous from the buyer's point of view, that is not a concern of this paper. From the seller's standpoint, demands can be correlated and the distribution of each new buyer's demand can be history dependent. We define "history" as the set of information that is revealed to the seller. Let ψ(t) denote the history up to time t and ψ i the history up to the arrival of buyer i. We assume that D i follows distribution function (cdf) F(· | ψ i−1 ), where ψ 0 . For the purpose of analysis, we make the following technical assumptions: (1) the expected demand from a buyer is always finite, and (2) there exists a lower envelope for the possible forms of F. We need a lower envelope of F to develop a lower bound of the value function in Section 6.3. 
Technical
Technical Assumption 2. There exists an increasing and continuous function
The sequence of events with the ith buyer is modeled as follows. (1) Let β i denote the exogenous, relative bargaining power of buyer i. It captures exogenous factors such as bargaining skills and the net cost of maintaining a long-term relationship. We assume that β i is known given the identity of buyer i. Conditional on history ψ, the bargaining power β of a potential buyer follows distribution B(· | ψ). The generalized Nash bargaining model predicts that if player j's payoff and outside option for the focal transaction are Π j (w) and d j , respectively, given the transaction price w, where j ∈ { } ∪ {1, 2, · · · , M}, then the bargaining results in price
* splits the pie between the buyer and the seller in proportion to their respective bargaining powers.
For buyer i, let r i and r i denote the profit margins before subtracting the cost of the product purchased from seller and an alternative supplier, respectively; p the posted price for 's product;c i the marginal cost of buying from the alternative; Q i the quantity available from the alternative; and ρ i the corresponding fill rate. In addition, let
Accordingly, the total payoff for buyer i is Π i (w i ) (r i − w i ) · Q i and the outside option is
Letc i r i − l i · r i + l i ·c i represent the net marginal cost of buying from the alternative supplier in order to keep the same margin r i . Ifc i > p, it is not credible for buyer i to switch, so the outside option is to buy from seller at the posted price. This is possible because products are not perfectly substitutable, andc i includes switching costs such as searching, redesigning, damage to the brand image, and so on. We assume thatc i is unknown to the seller ex ante but will be revealed during the negotiation. For a potential customer who has not arrived,c follows distribution G(· | ψ) given history ψ. Regarding the link between l i and D i or Q i , we can verify through simulations that, when η > 0.8, the correlations between l i and D i and between l i and Q i , respectively, are highly insignificant and thus ∂l i /∂D i ≈ 0 and ∂l i /∂Q i ≈ 0.
11 Hence, we make Assumption 3 to simplify our analysis. Admittedly, when η is small this assumption may not hold and the price-quantity relationship may become more complicated.
Technical Assumption 3. ∂l
For seller , let V(K, p, ψ(t)) represent the expected revenue obtained after time t given remaining capacity K, posted price p, and history ψ(t). Therefore, when bargaining with buyer i, seller has expected payoff
where { · } is an indicator function. In addition, we assume thatc i ≥ c L > s for every i so that the bargaining always has a solution (i.e., c L , the highest possible price a customer would like to pay, is higher than the marginal value for the seller). Hence, we have the following lemma, which determines whether buyer i pays the posted price or engages in price bargaining. Note that β i andc i are known when the buyer arrives.
Lemma 1. Ifc i > p, buyer i pays the posted price ifc i ≤ p, Nash bargaining results in
Lemma 1 simply states that the chance of a buyer engaging in a price negotiation increases with the posted price p. Hence, the higher the posted price, the more bargainers. It also states that the negotiated price is a function of the available capacity and transaction quantity. Based on Lemma 1, we know that as long as ∂V/∂K ≥ 0, our model satisfies the property that larger quantities entail larger total payments. 12 To understand how w i is affected by K i and Q i , we need to know more about value function V.
Source of Nonmonotonicity
In our model, we conjectured that a buyer's bargaining power β and net switching costc are not the source of price-quantity nonmonotonicity and thus assumed for simplicity that they are independent of purchase quantity Q. To verify our conjecture, we compare three different models by running nonlinear regressions.
From Lemma 1 we can derive the discount received by buyer i for product j:
where
c i j /p j . Now we see that three factors can contribute to the nonmonotonicity:ĉ i j , β i j , and v i j . Hence, we consider three different models. In preparation, we define
2 + , which is the piecewise polynomial function we used to capture the nonmonotonicity in the empirical analysis. In model (I), we assume that the nonmonotonicity is rooted in how the seller values capacity. In particular,ĉ b c · X c , β b b · X b , and v φ(r4ds) + b v · X v . In model (II), we assume that the nonmonotonicity is due to the net switching cost. In particular,ĉ φ(r4ds) + b c · X c , β b b · X b , and v b v · X v . In model (III), we assume that the nonmonotonicity is driven by the quantity-dependent bargaining power. In particular,ĉ b c · X c , β φ(r4ds) + b b · X b , and v b v · X v . Note that, although the three models have the same components, they are different in structure. The other explanatory variables in the analysis are as follows. We use lndod and 10 major brand names for X c , Cshr, and Vrate for X b and Cbase, lndod, CapL, and three quarters for X v .
We run three nonlinear regressions based on the following equation:
The results are summarized in Table 9 . Note that the nonmonotonicity is statistically significant only in model (I). In addition, given the same number of parameters or degrees of freedom (d.f.), model (I) has the highest R 2 and the lowest sum of squared residuals (SS). If we assume thatˆ is normally distributed, Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; * * p < 0.05; * * * p < 0.01.
Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 2108 -2126 , © 2016 we can use the corrected Akaike's information criterion (AIC C ) value (Akaike 1981) to compute the evidence ratio and compare the models. 13 This shows us that model (I) is 2.26 × 10 15 times more likely to be correct compared with model (II) and 239 times more likely compared with model (III). The evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of model (I) and we conclude that model (I) is the best model among the three.
Other models can be derived by combining models (II) and (III). However, a serious collinearity problem would exist if we let β depend on r4ds in (II) or letĉ depend on r4ds in (III). Hence, these models cannot provide better explanations. Last, when we add r4ds as a linear part ofĉ in model (I), we find that the estimated coefficient is not significant. Thus it is reasonable to assume thatĉ is not correlated with r4ds.
Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we first derive a sufficient condition on the value function for the price-quantity curve to be nonmonotonic. We then analyze the seller's problem, formulate the value function, and investigate its property. Finally, we show some examples of the price curve.
A Sufficient Condition for Nonmonotonicity
We assume V is a nondecreasing and twice-differentiable function of capacity K. To simplify the notation, we write V i (K) in place of V(K, p, ψ i ). We know that the relationship between the price w i and quantity Q i depends on the sign of the first-order derivative of w i in (5) with respect to Q i :
Given that β i /Q i > 0, the sign of ∂w i /∂Q i depends on that of
A simple examination leads us to the following proposition. 
V(K)
Capacity
The slope = Average opportunity cost
Although the above results are simple, they are surprising. Our initial intuition is that the value function should be concave and the price should decrease with quantity. However, in order to observe quantity discount, our simple model requires the value function to be convex. Figure 4 illustrates the intuition behind Proposition 1. Note that, given buyer i's outside option and bargaining power, w i depends on the seller's average opportunity cost of selling Q i units. We see that, as Q i increases, the average opportunity cost increases if the value function is concave and decreases if the value function is convex. Based on this observation, we suspect that the value function cannot be simply convex or concave in order to observe a nonmonotonic pricequantity relation. In fact, we show that a value function that is a combination of convex and concave functions will generate a nonmonotonic price-quantity curve.
Proposition 2. If there exists
Proposition 2 provides us with a sufficient condition for the price-quantity relation to be nonmonotonic. We call this property "convex-concave." We can infer from Figure 4 that, when the value function is convex-concave and the capacity level is high enough, the average cost of selling Q units for the seller first increases and then decreases with Q, which leads to a nonmonotonic price-quantity relation.
It is reasonable to expect the value function to be convex-concave or S-shaped. When capacity is very low, the seller is unlikely to fulfill any buyer's need and will have to salvage. As capacity increases, the likelihood of satisfying some buyers' needs increases. When capacity is very high, it may exceed demand and the seller may once again have to salvage a portion.
However, this result alone is not satisfactory, because it cannot explain the pricing pattern we observe in the data. The preceding discussion was based on perturbing the purchase quantity of a single buyer with a fixed-value function. If there are multiple buyers, the seller may update her estimation of future demand based on the demand of the current buyer. Thus, the shape of the value function may be different for buyers with different purchase quantities. In the following, we extend our analysis by formulating and analyzing the value function.
Formulating the Value Function
Assume that K units of capacity are available after the (i − 1)th buyer leaves. Let us consider the value of this remaining capacity in four cases that constitute the sample space. First, the leftover capacity may be salvaged with probability δ i . Second, if buyer i arrives, the buyer walks away immediately if the capacity is insufficient. Hence, if K < ηD i , the seller's expected revenue at
Clearly, this is a complicated function and it is not obvious how V i−1 (K) is affected by various parameters. Hence, we try to derive approximations for the value function in two cases: one with a finite buyer group and the other with a very large buyer group (i.e., M → ∞).
An Approximation with Finite M
In this section, we derive an upper and a lower bound for V i−1 (K) and we present the results in Theorem 1. In preparation, we define
The key idea of the proof for the lower bound is the following. First, setting ρ 1 in (9) leads to a lower bound of V i−1 (K). We then utilize the fact that the lower bound is a separable function of D and we iteratively plug the lower bound into (9). We complete the proof by induction. The proof for the upper bound is similar, except that we use ρ * ≤ 1. We have
Theorem 1. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ M and K ≥ 0,
Because of the relation lim K→+∞ F 0 (K − λK) 1, we have lim K→+∞ δ l i δ u i . Therefore, the upper and lower bounds converge as K goes to infinity. Both the upper and lower bounds take a functional form similar tô V M−1 (K, λ), and it is reasonable to expect that V i−1 (K) is similar to the bounds as long as they are close enough. We may also conclude that the shape of the value function is largely dependent on the demand distribution of the next buyer. However, the gap between the upper and lower bounds increases with M. Hence, the bounds will perform well when M is not very large. Otherwise, it may be useful to get bounds that are independent of M.
An Approximation with Infinite M
In this case, we assume that the buyer arrival rate is constantly λ b . Hence, the probability of ending the selling process is constant: δ λ 0 /(λ 0 + λ b ). Before we analyze V i−1 (K), note that we can write it as E[ (K, {D n , β n ,c n , t n − t n−1 } ∞ n i ) | ψ i−1 ], where is the total revenue, which is a function of the future demand, buyer bargaining power, net marginal cost of buying outside, and arrival times. Similarly,
Based on our assumptions, {D n , β n ,c n , t n − t n−1 } ∞ n i and {D n , β n ,c n , t n − t n−1 } ∞ n i+1 are statistically equivalent given information ψ i−1 . Thus, using this condition and the law of iterative expectation, we get Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 2108 -2126 , © 2016 
Leveraging this property of the value function, we obtain an upper bound and a lower bound for V i−1 (K). In preparation, let
which is an approximate measure for the expected revenue obtained from the ith buyer. Let
It is easy to see that h i (K) ∈ [0, 1]. Now we can introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For any i ≥ 1 and K ≥ 0, we have
Let U i−1 and L i−1 be the upper and lower bounds in (15), respectively. We have that
We can see that the percentage gap,
, also goes to 0 if s 0. When s > 0, the size of the absolute gap depends on Z i · K. The result implies that the bounds will perform particularly well at the beginning of the selling season, when the capacity is relatively large compared with the average buying quantity. The gap is also decreasing in δ, E[β | ψ i−1 ], and G(p | ψ i−1 ). The bounds are closer to the true value function when the leftover capacity is more likely to be salvaged, buyers are more powerful on average, and buyers are more likely to engage in price bargaining. The condition (∂/∂K)V i (K) ≥ s should be satisfied by definition because we assume that the seller can always salvage the capacity at marginal value s. Thus, s should be the lowest marginal value for V i (K).
Discussion
Note that H i (K) can be written in the form of a ·
, where a and a are parameters independent of K. Thus, the upper and lower bounds given by Theorems 1 and 2 can all be written in the form of
, where a, a , and a are parameters independent of K. Moreover, we learn from the proof of Theorem 1 that the value function of a single-period problem takes a similar form. In essence we are approximating the value function by a single-period problem in which the seller treats the next buyer as the last one. This is very likely to be the mental heuristic used by a salesperson. More importantly, the approximations in both cases suggest that the shapes of bounds depend on the demand distribution of the next buyer. We find that if the demand is normally distributed, the bounds are all convexconcave.
Proposition 3. If the demand is normally distributed, then the bounds are all convex-concave.
Other unimodal distributions such as Cauchy distribution and Student's t-distribution can also generate S-shaped bounds, and the proof is similar. Due to the page limit, we skip the proof. Since it is quite natural to expect a unimodal demand distribution, it is reasonable to expect that the value function is also convexconcave as described in Proposition 2, given that the bounds are tight enough.
Plotting the Price Curve
From (5) we know that the negotiated transaction price w i is a linear combination of both parties' outside options. The seller's outside option is the average opportunity cost of selling Q i , which depends on Q i , capacity K i , and the value function. In this section, we first investigate the performance and the shape of the bounds given a normal demand distribution and then try to plot the price curve for different parameters.
Without loss of generality, we consider the seller negotiating with buyer i for quantity Q i at time t i . As in the regression models, we control for capacity level, bargaining power, posted price, and demand uncertainty, as well as all the other buyer-, product-, and market-related factors. In the base case, we set K 10,
, and η 0.9. We assume that arrival rates satisfy λ i /λ 0 (M − i)/i 2 , which means that the buyer arrival rate is linear in the number of potential buyers and the technology shock arrival rate increases quadratically in the number of buyers that have arrived. In addition, we assume that the demand of the next buyer is normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation σ µ · C V , where C V 0.25 is a constant. After observing Q i , the seller updates belief and sets µ min{12, 16 − s m × Q i } where s m captures the market structure; that is, larger s m means more concentrated demand. This way of updating implies that if buyer i is very large, the rest of the buyers are likely to be small, especially when the seller knows in advance the market structure and the identities of the buyers. F 0 is normal distribution with mean 12 and standard deviation 12 · C V . Finally, we set
See the proof of Theorem 2 for justifications.
In Figure 5 , we present three numerical examples of the bounds for both finite and infinite M. We can see that the bounds for finite M perform better with smaller M; the performance of the bounds for infinite M depends on the assumption of δ, and they work better with larger δ. In both cases, the bounds are S-shaped given the normal demand distribution.
In Figure 6 , we use the upper bounds in each case (of finite versus infinite M) as the approximation of the value function and generate the negotiated price for three different scenarios. With an S-shaped value function, we obtain a price-quantity curve in all scenarios that is reverse N-shaped, which is consistent with our empirical observations.
Managerial Implications
According to our model, the reason some buyers are receiving lower discounts than those who buy less is as follows: large buyers accelerate the selling process and small buyers are helpful in consuming the residual capacity. However, satisfying midsized buyers may be costly because supplying these buyers can make it difficult to utilize the remaining capacity that may be too much for small buyers but not enough for large buyers. This logic is reflected in the S-shaped value function, as the seller's marginal opportunity cost of selling to a buyer (or marginal loss of value) increases the most with the purchase quantity when the remaining capacity gets close to the mean demand of the next buyer. In this section, we begin by discussing the capacity allocation decision for the seller given the nonmonotonic price-quantity relation. Basically, the seller needs to avoid midsized transactions by controlling the capacity allocation. Next, we discuss how the posted Management Science, 2017 , vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 2108 -2126 , © 2016 price should be set given its influence on the selling process.
Dynamic Capacity Rationing
In this setting the seller should control the capacity that is allocated to each buyer while staying in a range that is acceptable to the buyer. Given the complexity of the value function and the price-quantity relation, it is not immediately clear whether the seller should increase or decrease the allocated capacity. Based on our model, we derive a simple rule for deciding the quantity. A rationing decision depends on the remaining capacity level, purchase quantity, demand distribution, and the buyer's profit margin before subtracting the cost of this product. If we hold r i constant, the allocated capacity should be reduced when K − Q i is close to the anticipated mean of the demand from the next buyer; otherwise, the seller should sell as much as possible. This enables the seller to reduce the likelihood of losing the next major buyer due to insufficient capacity. Due to the shape of the value function, V i (K − Q i ) is likely to be higher when K − Q i is neither too high nor too low. On the other hand, if we hold V i (K − Q i ) constant, then capacity reduction is more likely to benefit the seller when the buyer has a lower profit margin. Clearly the seller should reserve capacity for buyers who are willing to pay more. Overall, we can conclude that the allocation decisions cannot be based solely on capacity levels and purchase quantities of the current buyer.
Posted-Price Optimization
When the posted price is determined, two important factors related to the selling process should be considered. First, we learn from Lemma 1 that the posted price determines not only the price a buyer pays but also the number of price-takers. A price that is too low undercuts the seller's profitability; a price that is too high encourages more buyers to engage in bargaining. Second, the seller's revenue is a function of both the posted price and the average discount received by bargainers. Hence, incorrect anticipations of the average discount (or essentially the opportunity cost of selling to each buyer) will lead to suboptimal posted prices. Our model can be used by sellers to optimize the posted price while considering the price-taker-bargainer trade-off and a nonmonotonic price-quantity relationship with bargainers. The optimal posted price is p * arg max p V 0 (κ, p). Readers are referred to the electronic companion for details.
Implications for Other Industries
There are other industries that resemble the semiconductor industry. In the travel, airline, and hotel industries, limited capacities have to be sold within a limited period. Customers in these industries include bulk buyers such as travel agencies and resellers who also negotiate prices. Findings from our study may carry over to these businesses. There are, however, a few important differences between the semiconductor industry and the others. In the semiconductor industry, the obsolescence date is stochastic while for the other industries it is deterministic. Also, purchase quantities may be subject to negotiations in other industries. However, other industries may behave as if they have stochastic obsolescence dates due to the uncertainty in the arrivals of buyers (i.e., the seller is not sure if another buyer will come along before the capacity is salvaged). In addition, even if the quantity is subject to negotiation, we may still observe a nonmonotonic price-quantity relationship, because selling midsized quantities remains costly for sellers given fixed capacities. Theoretically, Lemma 1 and Equation (6) still hold even if both price and quantity are determined via Nash bargaining. Therefore, the formulation of the value function as well as the subsequent analysis remains unchanged.
Concluding Remarks
In this data-driven research, we studied the pricequantity relationship in a B2B market in which the product life cycle is short and prices are set through one-shot negotiations. Using data from the microprocessor market, we found that the price can be a nonmonotonic function of the purchase quantity. Contrary to our intuition, larger quantities can actually lead to higher prices. In particular, we observed an N-shaped discount curve in the data. In our empirical analysis we controlled for a number of factors that offer competing explanations for our observation. We also showed that some of the omitted variables do not alter the key observation.
We developed and analyzed a stylized model to delve into this phenomenon to understand the underlying rationale. Our analysis reveals that it is fairly plausible for the price-quantity relation to be nonmonotonic. If the value of residual capacity is convex-concave, we can then observe a nonmonotonic price-quantity curve. Although we normally assume that the value function is increasing and concave, our model shows that this is not necessarily true in B2B markets. Instead, if the demand is normally distributed, the value function is likely to be convex-concave. More importantly, we found that a convex-concave value function is enough to explain our empirical observation, that is, an N-shaped discount curve.
There are many limitations to our work. Our analysis assumes a static Nash bargaining model with fixed capacity. Future research may obtain different pricequantity relations by considering dynamic strategic bargaining and capacity levels that diminish with time. Also it was impossible for us to consider and eliminate all other explanations for the N-shaped curve. It is possible that certain behavioral biases may also result in this pricing pattern. We sincerely hope that our work stimulates additional theoretical and empirical research.
